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PERSONAL

President Dwisht D. Eisenhower The white House Washington, D. J.

Dear Mr. Presidents

In your statement December 3, 1959 on the eve of your departure for Surope and Adia, you asked that each of us think and set in such a way as to hasten progress toward our famorican objectives - one of which, as you have often said, is a more: disarmament agreement. It is in this spirit that I follow up my letter to you of October 19th - on which you seted with A good result. Now the same subject is at the stage where it needs further action.

The brief background is this. The suggestion on October 19th was that you consider setting up within the Government at the earliest possible moment an adequately supported, permanent unit dealing with the subject of disavanement. As the result of General Goodpaster's call to Mr. Goolidge, I was asked by Mr. Coolidge to define more precisely the general idea contained in the October 19th Letter. This I did both in conversation with Mr. Coolidge on October 30th, and in a follow-up memo, which ha requested, dated Movember 2nd. The gist of these communications: was to recommend that a permanent unit be set-up in the Bosontive Office of the President under a Director who would have responsibility for the continuing study and formulation of policy recommendations on disarrament - a subject in which many agencies besides State have a direct interest. The negotiation, public relations, and Compressional relations functions of discrement would be left with the State Department. The reasons for this recommendation and a description of the organisation envisaged were given in the November 2nd memo (attached).

Mr. Coolidge's response to me - a memo dated November 6th was favorable. He said he was sending it to State. He later sent Secretary Herter a letter making a similar recommend to tion. Dr. Kistishowski and the Killian disermement panel likewise made a sindler proposal. The people in State dealing with

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disarmment agreed informally with the logic of the proposal but laid great stress of selecting the right men to direct such an effice. The kind of a person impliened for such a position was william Foster. There are other people, however, in the State Department - who are not directly concerned with disarmement - who favor having it in ttate.

In general, then, the great preponderance of opinion of those who have given the problem study and who have been directly concerned with the subject favor a permanent unit in the Executive Office. Such a set-up would have advantages not realised under the present set-up. It would be a legacy this Administration could leave in a field in which you have shown great interest and which is one of the greatest long-term importance to the United States.

Studies by such a unit are required as soon as possible as a basis for later recommendations which go beyond the Goolidge report, and which, in this period of deterrence, would seek a step to the arms race and a stabilizing of the deterrence, and then, later would look toward reducing these weapons below the level of simililation. Mr. Goolidge has made a start but was handicapped by lack of such studies and by lack of time. His recommendations are excellent as far as they go - but they don't go nearly far enough.

what I have said, I say in the spirit of trying to be helpful and in line with your injunction of December 3rd that each of us think and act in such a way as to hasten our progress towards the goals which we all seek. In this regard, may I orngratulate you on the attitude you have been taking toward Khruschev and the USSR; on your Asia trip; and, most of all, on the sound attitude you have recently expressed toward the so-called missile gap and the US military posture with reference to negotiations. Too often people out of fear seem to emphasize the dangers in Khruschev's relaxation of tension policy to the exclusion of the apportunities it affords us if we have the confidence we cannot to have in the ability of our own system to compete with the Communists.

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Attachment